Software Defined Networking (SDN) extends capabilities of existing networks by providing various functionalities, such as flexible networking controls. However, there are many security threat vectors in SDN, including existing and emerging ones arising from new functionalities, that may hinder the use of SDN. To tackle this problem, many countermeasures have been developed to mitigate various threats faced in SDN. However, their effectiveness must be analyzed and compared to fully understand how security posture of SDN changes when the countermeasure is adopted. Also, it becomes difficult to optimize the security of SDN without using a systematic approach to evaluate the security posture of SDN. In this paper, we propose a novel framework to systematically model and analyze the security posture of SDN. We develop a novel graphical security model formalism named Threat Vector Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (TV-HARM), which provides a systematic approach to evaluate threats, attacks and countermeasures for SDN. The TV-HARM captures different threats and their combinations, enabling security risk assessment of SDN. In addition, we define three new security metrics to represent security of SDN. Our experimental results showed that the proposed security assessment framework can capture and evaluate various security threats to SDN, demonstrating the applicability and feasibility of the proposed framework.
Li et al. [6] used the OpenFlow features using edge devices with SDN protocol. However, if a security problem occurs in SDN, it can have a catastrophic impact on those promising applications and other systems relying on the operations of SDN. Unfortunately, SDN introduces new threat vectors that need to be taken into account for an in-depth security risk assessment [7] . For example, there are new types of networking components in SDN (e.g., the SDN controller) to support the new networking functionalities. As a result, there may exist vulnerabilities that may have not been considered in the traditional security assessment methods (i.e., the inability to capture the security properties of new networking components of SDN). As a result, various work has been performed to improve the security of SDN [8] [9] [10] . However, there is still a lack of robust approaches to evaluate the security of SDN taking into account all the threat vectors in SDN.
Our main motivation is to propose a novel threat modeling and security risk analysis framework for SDN. In the SDN environment, unlike the existing network, an SDN controller exists. The SDN controllers have vulnerabilities in SDN applications and communication protocols, where traditional networks do not have such components. An attacker can perform eavesdropping or launch a privilege escalation attack. In such cases, those new vulnerabilities need to be considered the security risk analysis which the traditional methods of security assessment may not be able to capture and analyze.
One systematic approach leverages the power of graphical security models [11] , [12] to evaluate the security posture and compare the effectiveness of different defense mechanisms. Although SDN security has been studied previously, existing studies used SDN devices and their attributes (e.g., vulnerability) to evaluate the security posture of SDN. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work used graphical security models to deal with the threat vectors existing in SDN. Security risk analysis via the graphical security models incorporates the complex relationships between vulnerabilities in SDN. This can be used to evaluate the changes in the attack surface and formulate the most effective countermeasure to be deployed for SDN environments. In this paper, first, we propose a novel security risk analysis framework for SDN by incorporating various threat vectors. Second, we develop a novel graphical security model named Threat Vector HARM (TV-HARM) that extends the capabilities of the Hierarchical Attack Representation Models (HARM) [13] . TV-HARM perform can (1) capture dynamic changes of SDN, (2) assess complex attack and defense scenarios, and (3) represent the security posture using various security metrics in SDN.
The contributions of our paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel security risk evaluation framework taking into account existing and new threat vectors in SDN;
• We develop a new graphical security model named ''Threat Vector HARM (TV-HARM)'' that can analyze existing and emerging threat vectors in SDN, which includes, -(1) capturing dynamic changes of SDN; -(2) assessing complex attack and defense scenarios; -(3) representing the security posture using various security metrics in SDN. • We evaluate the security of SDN using three security assessment metrics including Network Centrality Measures, Vulnerability Scores, and Attack Impact Metrics;
• We demonstrate the applicability and feasibility of our proposed approach via experimental analysis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background and related work on SDN security. Section III presents our proposed security risk assessment framework for SDN, including the security modeling and analysis of SDN using TV-HARM. The experiments and their results are presented in Section IV. We discuss our findings and the limitations in Section V, and finally, we conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. OPENFLOW APPLICATION SECURITY
Gude et al. [14] developed a network operating system called NOX using the OpenFlow switch. However, the focus of the research was on performance rather than security. Casado et al. [15] introduced SANE to control the flow at the central server to protect the enterprise network. Although they do not use an OpenFlow switch or the SDN controller, the behavior of SANE is similar to SDN. The work did not consider all SDN threat vectors. The FlowNAC is a solution to manage the network by authorizing users based on network flow [16] . It used a method to apply adequate policies in SDN. This approach only deals with access control and does not consider all the threats in SDN. Nayak et al. [17] proposed a dynamic access control system named Resonance that utilizes flow-level information and real-time alerts. The system does not provide a security overview of SDN. Cheng et al. [18] proposed a security platform named OSCO, which supports highly configurable cryptography algorithm modules and protocols, flexible hardware extensions, and virtualized SDN networks. The enhanced OpenFlow protocol only considered improving the security of the data plane.
B. VIRTUAL NETWORKS SECURITY
Shin et al. [19] introduced FRESCO that provides a framework for developing OpenFlow security applications and detection and mitigation modules available in OpenFlow. However, it only addresses the security aspects of SDN operations, not the whole network security. That is, the security of SDN components (e.g., SDN controllers and routers) are not taken into account. Chung et al. [20] proposed a framework named NICE which can detect and respond to attacks in Virtual Network Systems. NICE provides vulnerability detection, measurement, and countermeasure selection. It has an attack graph-based analysis model and a reconfigurable virtual network-based countermeasure. The NICE framework can be adopted into SDN security assessment, but SDN-specific components are not taken into account in the framework.
C. SDN SECURITY
The overview of various threats in SDN is summarized by Kreutz et al. [7] , presenting the seven threat vectors that can exist in SDN and potential solutions to mitigate them. Out of those seven SDN threats, three of them are specific to the SDN controller. This shows the importance of providing security for the new SDN components, as the security of the system can be degraded significantly when exploited. SDN-specific attack methods are discussed in [9] and various countermeasures against the attacks in SDN in [8] , but they focused on threats specific to SDN components only. As a result, the applicability of the mitigations in conjunction with the existing vulnerabilities and countermeasures (i.e., non-SDN security components) is not described. Ghosh et al. [21] proposed a security framework for SDN-enabled smart power grids. They deployed IDS to detect attack events by closely monitoring control-commands from the SDN controller to/from SCADA master. Their specialized use of the framework makes it difficult to generalize the approach in general SDN scenarios. Chowdhary et al. [22] proposed dynamic game-based security framework in SDN-enabled cloud networking. Although the framework can be applied for other SDN-based architectures, specific SDN threat vectors are not taken into account. Similarly, Shi et al. [23] proposed a security framework for SDN based on attribute-based encryption, which does not capture all SDN threat vectors identified in [7] . Porras et al. [24] proposed security mechanisms at the SDN control layer. It called SE-Floodlight. The SE-Floodlight is a security-enhanced version of the popular OpenFlow Floodlight Controller that extends Floodlight through a secure execution kernel. They designed the extended security for the control layer and proposed conflict management of flow rules that occurs when distributing multiple applications within a network. However, they only focused on the SDN controls without considering the interaction between existing vulnerabilities and their effects on SDN. Moreover, there are techniques proposed previously to address one or multiples of those identified threats in SDN [25] , [26] .
III. SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SDN
A. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW Figure 1 plots our proposed security assessment framework for SDN. This framework has five phases: (1) data collection, (2) system model generation, (3) threat model generation, (4) security assessment, and (5) countermeasure selection.
First, the data collection phase collects and processes 'raw' information about SDN components (i.e., hosts, flow tables, controller settings/services etc.) and the vulnerabilities information for SDN components. We use some existing flow tables and threats information [9] to construct a system model (phase 1). Second, the system model generation phase constructs SDN system model based on the processed information collected in phase (1) . We describe SDN system model and present an example for SDN (phase 2). Based on the flow tables and threats information, we define three attack scenarios that can occur in three types of operations to apply these attacks to the system model.
Third, the threat model generation phase identifies the threats imposed onto SDN system based on the given vulnerabilities, flow table and the generated system model. The threat model is further divided into control flow threat model and data flow threat model. The control flow threat model describes threats that can affect the SDN controller or the OF switch, and the data flow threat model shows the threats between SDN hosts in the data plane. The threat model handles the attack paths and threat information for the security assessment. we describe threat models by introducing threat vectors for each SDN node (phase 3). We use the attack scenarios to describe the threat vectors of the system. Fourth, security assessment phase evaluates and identifies potential threats in SDN by correlating the system and the packet flow. To efficiently evaluate the security of SDN, the network centrality measures can be used to identify critical nodes in the system [27] . Instead of network routes, attack routing paths are used to identify critical nodes in the system with respect to the attack evaluated. The vulnerability scores can highlight the severity of attacks that can cause a significant impact on SDN. We can use the vulnerability scores to calculate the system risk to overview the security posture of SDN. We can evaluate SDN security based on attack paths and the risk using the attack impact metrics. This method analyzes the attack rate and impact, and uses them to determine the security of the system, taking into account different attack scenarios and capabilities. In the final phase of the framework, the countermeasure is selected based on the security evaluation results based on the network centrality measures, vulnerability scores and the attack impact metric values.
Finally, the countermeasure selection phase selects optimal countermeasures and deployed in SDN. The countermeasure we use in this paper is based on the work [1] , [20] , which are Linux patch (a type of Software patch), Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) or Creating Filtering Rules (CFR). We demonstrate the countermeasure selection based on their effectiveness comparisons in Section IV.
B. FRAMEWORK DETAILS 1) SYSTEM MODEL Overview: Figure 2 depicts an example of SDN that will be used for our simulation to show the feasibility of our proposed security assessment framework for SDN. This example SDN is used to demonstrate the operations of SDN and we carry out simulations by extending this example SDN network. The example SDN that we have configured consists of one controller and three OpenFlow switches (denoted as OFS i ). Each OFS is connected to one physical server. The server connected to the OFS 1 runs two Virtual Machine (VMs) and acts as a web server in SDN network. Of course, individual hosts can be connected to the OF switches directly and provide services. In either setting, the attack scenario is the same. OFS 1 has three ports enabled; the port 1 is connected to the router, the port 2 is connected to the web server, and the port 3 connected to the 2nd OFS (i.e., OFS 2 ) and used to exchange packets with OFS 2 . The application (App) server connected to OFS 2 contains two VMs and acts as an app server in SDN network. Similar to OFS 1 , OFS 2 has three ports enabled; the port 1 is connected to OFS 1 , the port 2 is connected to the app server, and the port 3 is connected to OFS 3 , respectively. The Database server connected to OFS 3 run one VM and acts as a database. OFS 3 has two ports enabled; the port 1 is connected to OFS 2 and the port 2 is used to exchange packets with the database.
Flow Table: according to phase 1 in the framework III, the framework collects reachability information (i.e., how VMs are connected) first. The reachability information is derived from flow table(s). Table 1 shows an example of a  flow table.  When a flow table such as Table 1 is applied in an SDN configuration as depicted in Figure 2 , the system operates as follows. When a user attempts to make a request (by sending a packet) to the system, the packet is received by the router and sent to OFS 1 . OFS 1 sends the packet to the web server by the specified flow rule, and the web server checks the packet and processes the request. Then, the web server sends a request to the app server for further processing. If OFS 1 receives a packet from this web server, the switch forwards it to port 3. When a forwarded packet arrives at OFS 2 , OFS 2 sends it to the app server according to the flow rule, and the app server processes the request. The app server sends a packet to the database to send a request, and OFS 2 , which receives the packet from the app server, forwards to port 3. OFS 3 , which receives the packet, forwards the packet to the database, and finally, the database processes the request.
2) THREAT INFORMATION
A part of phase 2 in the framework is about processing threat information within the system model and used them to build threat models via graphical security models (see phase 3 of the framework). Table 2 shows the operating systems running on each VM. For example, VM 1 on the web server is running Windows 7 as an operating system. The SDN controller (denoted as CTL 1 ) can run either OpenDayLight (ODL) or Open Network Operating System (ONOS). All the OFS run OpenFlow Spec 1.3.0. The software vulnerabilities information can be collected based on operating systems and applications. The software vulnerabilities information in VM and CTL in SDN network is summarized in Table 3 .
Only one vulnerability was assigned to each VM for simplicity, but the whole set of vulnerabilities in applications and operating systems can be incorporated, modeled and evaluated in graphical security modeling in such a way that we did in [28] and [29] . Those vulnerabilities can be found using various methods and vulnerability scanning tools such as NESSUS [30] . We used the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [31] Base Score (BS) in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Vulnerabilities specific to SDN (i.e., flows, controllers, etc) can also be detected using vulnerability detection methods in work [9] , [32] [33] [34] . The SDN controller may have different vulnerabilities depending on SDN applications; the SDN controller using ODL has v 6 whereas it using ONOS has v 7 .
We specify three different threats for the example SDN. The three threats are marked with the red solid lines in the Figure 2: (1) direct threat to VM, (2) direct threat to the SDN controller, and (3) threat to the SDN controller through VM. In particular, the threat (2) and (3) are specific to the SDN environment where such attacks are not possible in other typical networks. The details are as follows:
(1) Threat to VM. An attacker can exploit a vulnerability in the VM to attack a web server connected to the internet. Then, the attacker target other servers in the system through the web server. In this case, there is a threat that an attacker can directly exploit the vulnerabilities of the VMs existing in the system. This threat is also present in existing networks (i.e. existing models can evaluate this too). If an attacker is successful in exploiting this vulnerability, it can interfere with the operation of the VM or acquire information existing in the VM and the attacker can also obtain the administrator's privilege of the VM.
(2) Threat to the SDN Controller. The flow of SDN network is determined by SDN application used in the SDN controller. However, if an attacker acquires administrator privileges of the SDN controller or manages the message using the malicious SDN application, the network flow can be modified according to the intention of the attacker. Therefore, there is a threat that the attacker can directly attack SDN controller. [9] . If an attacker succeeds using these attack methods, the SDN controller can be disabled or manipulated according to the attacker's intention.
(3) Threat to the SDN Controller through VM. If an attacker obtains the VM administrator's privilege, the attacker can send packets to the SDN controller through the OF Switch connected with the VM. Then the attacker can attack the SDN controller by sending a malicious packet. In OpenFlow 1.3.0, the switch can filter packets using a firewall. Therefore, if all packets other than the defined flow rules are blocked, it is impossible for the attacker to send a packet to the SDN controller through the switch. On the other hand, if a switch requests a controller to determine a flow rule for an undefined packet, an attacker can attack the SDN controller via the switch. In this case, there is a threat that the VM can attack the SDN controller. [9] . This threat differs from the threat of directly attacking the SDN controller using the malicious SDN application. Attacks using malicious SDN applications are primarily intended to manipulate the behavior of the SDN controller. On the other hand, the threat of attacking the SDN controller in the VM is mainly deceiving the SDN controller.
3) THREAT MODEL VIA GRAPHICAL SECURITY MODELS
We used a two-layer Threat Vector-Hierarchical Attack Representation Model (TV-HARM) for threat modeling and analysis [35] , [36] , a novel extension to the HARM to capture ''threat-based attacks'' rather than individual attacks taking into account the threat vectors in SDN. TV-HARM may vary depending on the combination of threat vectors used in the model configuration, which is different from the HARM that models all system components (i.e. we cannot use the HARM as is). Hence, we define the TV-HARM taking into account threat vectors as follows.
First, the combination of threat vectors (TV) can be defined as below:
Definition 1: A combination of threat vectors C i = {tv 1 , tv 2 , tv 3 , . . . , tv i }, tv i ∈ 2 TV . tv i is a member of a power set of all threat vectors TV .
We created a TV-HARM using the defined combinations of threat vectors. More specifically, a TV-HARM is a two-layered model, where the upper layer captures the mapping of SDN components and their reachability using the Attack Graph (AG). The lower layer captures the vulnerability information using the Attack Tree (AT) [13] . The definition of the TV-HARM is as follows.
Definition 2: The TV-HARM is defined as a 3-tuple
where, M c i is the mapping between the upper and lower layer components. The representation of at h associated to the host h ∈ H is as follows:
• L h c i : A ⊆ h vuls Given the definitions of the TV-HARM, the example SDN in the form of the TV-HARM can be represented as follows.
To represent one TV-HARM, the upper layer, the lower layer, and the mapping between the two layers must be defined. Therefore, we defined the examples 1, 2, and 3 for the TV-HARM shown in Figure 3 For instance, we assume an attacker's objective is to launch an information acquisition attack or a Denial of Service attack on the DB, the attacker can attempt to attack the VM in the data plane using the attack method available in the existing network. But, if a system such as Figure 2 is functioning normally, malicious packets cannot go to the internal network because the web server checks the packets. However, an attacker can attack the SDN controller via tv 123 , and attack the connected switch by using the authority of the SDN controller after the attack succeeds. If the attacker can successfully modify the flow table by attacking the OF switch connected to the SDN controller, the attacker can set the desired attack path. Then, the attacker can send the packets to the app server without checking them on the web server. This makes the system more dangerous. The way an attacker can attack an SDN controller or switch is discussed in [9] . Therefore, in the SDN environment, not only the hosts present in the data plane, but also the SDN controller and the switches need the security evaluation. To solve this problem, we classify the models into the Control Flow Threat Model VOLUME 7, 2019 and Data Flow Threat Model. We constructed four attack scenarios based on the purpose and attack method.
• Attack Scenario 1: The attacker exploits threat to the SDN controller directly. The attacker's goal is to modify the flow Figure 3 (a).
• Attack Scenario 2: The attacker exploits threat to the SDN controller through VM. The attacker's goal is to modify the flow Figure 3 (b).
• Attack Scenario 3: The attacker exploits threat to the SDN controller directly and through VM. The attacker's goal is to modify the flow table of OFS 1 . The attacker attacks the SDN controller using the malicious app (tv 1 ) or attacked VM (tv 23 ). Attack methods include all attack methods of Attack Scenarios 1 and 2. Then, attack the connected OF switch using the authority of the SDN controller. The model can be seen in Figure 3 (c).
• Attack Scenario 4: The attacker exploits threat to VM. The attacker's goal is to get the information stored in VM 5 . An attacker attacks a VM connected to the external Internet using a vulnerability in the VM (tv 2 ). Then the attacker attempts to attack using the connected VMs until the attacker succeeds in attacking the VM 5 . The model can be seen in Figure 4 (a).
VM 1 and VM 2 protect the internal network from external attacks. And OFS 1 sends all packets from external network to VM 1 and VM 2 . However, if an attacker successfully compromises the SDN controller using the attack scenarios 1, 2, or 3, the attacker gains permission to modify the flow table. The attacker can then try to connect directly from the external network to the internal network by modifying the flow table of OFS 1 as shown in Table 4 . Then all the packets arriving at OFS 1 will be sent to OFS 2 . At this point, the attacker can send packets to the app server without checking the packets on the web server. In this case, the Data Flow Threat Model changes as in Figure 4 (b). We have already discussed a similar model in [37] . However, if an attacker compromises the SDN controller and maliciously changes the network flow, the system could become more vulnerable. Therefore, security evaluation of the SDN controller and OF switch is important in for the SDN environment. 
4) SECURITY ASSESSMENT USING SECURITY METRICS
We carry out security assessments using three methods (phase 3 of the proposed framework). First, we used the Network Centrality Measure to consider the importance of each node that constitutes the threat model. The second is security assessment using vulnerability scores. We evaluated the security of the system using known vulnerabilities. Finally, we used the attack impact metrics to evaluate security.
a: NETWORK CENTRALITY MEASURE
Using the Network Centrality Measure in the graphical model, we can consider the importance of each node and find the important nodes. A detailed description of the Network Centrality Measure can be found in [27] . Among them, we used the degree centrality and betweenness centrality measures. Degree centrality is determined by the number of edges connected to other nodes. For example, in Figure 3 (a), the degree centrality of C 1 is 4. The higher the degree centrality of a node, the more connections it has with other nodes. Therefore, the node is likely be important in the system. Betweenness centrality is determined by the ratio that the i th host is included in the attack path. Generally, betweenness centrality sets all nodes as start nodes or destination nodes and analyzes each path. And it considers the shortest path only. However, in this paper, the attacker and target are defined, so we analyzed only the path. Security evaluation should also consider all possible attack paths. So, we calculated the betweenness centrality for all attack paths. For example, in Figure 4 (a), the number of attack paths is 4. And there are two attack paths including VM 1 . Therefore, the betweenness centrality of VM 1 is 0.5. If the attacker successfully attacks OFS 1 and the data flow threat model changes as shown in Figure 4(b) , the number of attack paths is 6. However, since there are still two attack paths involving VM 1 , the betweenness centrality of VM 1 is 0.33.
b: VULNERABILITY SCORE
When assessing the security of a networked system, we can use known vulnerabilities and their associated metrics (e.g., the common vulnerability scoring system). We used the vulnerabilities listed in Table 3 to demonstrate the security evaluation phase of our proposed threat model. To do so, we calculate the probability of attack success and risk using the CVSS base score and impact score for each vulnerability. Details of the CVSS vulnerabilities can be found in [31] .
First, we calculate the probability of attack success and risk for a single vulnerability, v i . The probability of attack success of the vulnerability v i can be expressed as p v i , and the formula to calculate is the equation 1. One of the CVSS metrics represents an exploitability ranging from 0 to 10, which we use in our work as the probability of the attack by scaling between 0 and 1. The risk can be expressed as r v i , and is calculated as equation 2. The impact value is also used from the CVSS impact metric for the known vulnerability. To deal with vulnerabilities without the CVSS details is out of scope in this paper.
Next, we calculate the security metric of the host. If we know the security metric of the vulnerability that the host has, we can calculate the security metric of the host. The probability of attack success and risk of a host can be expressed as p h and r h , and the equation is as follows.
The next step is the security metric calculation of the attack path. One attack path is represented by ap. The security metric for one ap in the model using the threat vector c i is Finally, the total probability and total risk of the system in the model using the threat vector c i can be expressed as p c i and r c i , respectively. The formula for calculating is as follows.
However, there may be unknown vulnerabilities (e.g., vulnerabilities in the SDN controllers such as Floodlight and POX are not known). Therefore, security evaluation using vulnerabilities may not be applicable in all SDN settings. Also, if the attacker obtains administrator privileges of the SDN controller, the flow table can be modified without exploiting the vulnerability of the OpenFlow Switch. Because this attack method does not know the exact vulnerability score, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate changes to the security with respect to varying vulnerability associated metrics.
c: ATTACK IMPACT METRICS
The security evaluation using the attack impact metrics is a method that can show the comprehensive security of the system. Figure 5 shows the attack impact metrics we used. Columns represent the probability of attack success and rows represent impact. We analyzed the attack rate over all possible attack paths in a given threat model. Here, we assume that an attacker will attack equally on possible attack nodes. If an attacker can hardly attack the target (less than 20%), it is defined as 'Rare'. On the other hand, if an attack occurs frequently and the target is more likely to be attacked (more than 80%), it is defined as 'Almost Certain'. And we analyze the attack impact according to the extent to which the service interferes with the attack success. The service was based on web service, which is the role of the system. If an attacker has successfully attacked the system and the function of the system is rarely operating, it is defined as 'Critical'. On the other hand, if an attacker succeeds in an attack but does not affect the functionality of the system, it is defined as 'Negligible'.
For example, the system of Figure 2 is as follows. First, we assume that the processing time of the web server is 2 seconds, the processing time of the app server is 2 seconds, and the processing time of the DB is 1 second. And we calculated the total processing time when a total of 100 requests were made from the user once per second. If the system is in a normal state, it takes 104 seconds for all requests to be processed. However, if one of the two VMs on the web server or one of the two VMs on the app server fails, the processing time increases to 203 seconds. However, since both the web server and the app server have two VMs, the service is not impossible. Therefore, if only one of the VMs on the web server or the app server is attacked, the impact is moderate.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
There is a lack of research using graphical security models (e.g., an Attack Graph) to evaluate the security of SDN considering both data and control plane threats [20] , [38] . But to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to evaluate the security posture of SDN including both data and control planes using a graphical security model. In our work, we use TV-HARM to evaluate the security posture.
In this section, we used the three security metrics introduced in Section III-B.4. Through experimental analysis, we will show how security metrics vary when countermeasures are applied in SDN. In particular, we focus on a subset of threats, where the attack goal is to compromise the database in SDN. To mitigate these attacks, we consider three countermeasures including (a) Enterprise Linux patch, (b) Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) or (c) Creating Filtering Rules (CFR) and SDN Software patch. The Enterprise Linux patch prevents a vulnerability in a VM using Enterprise Linux. DPI or CFR allows blocking of malicious packets by examining packets sent from the VM to the SDN controller. The SDN Software patch prevents an attacker from using the malicious SDN application. Of course, other countermeasures can also be used in the framework to evaluate their effectiveness. We evaluate the effectiveness of those countermeasures using the three security metrics NCM, Vulnerability Score, and Attack Impact in sections IV-A, IV-B, and IV-C, respectively.
A. NETWORK CENTRALITY METRICS
We first evaluate the importance of each SDN node using the network centrality measures. The results are shown in tables 5 and 6 using degree centrality and betweenness centrality measures, respectively. Table 5 shows that when we apply different countermeasures, their effectiveness varies as highlighted by different importance value of each SDN node. This is expected as different countermeasures affect the system dependencies differently (e.g., an attack path in SDN could be removed when a vulnerability is patched). For example, from the results of the three Control Flow Threat Models shown in Table 5 (a), we can see that CTL 1 is the most important node (i.e. highest average degree centrality value across all threat vectors), followed by VM 1 and VM 2 . The results of the Data Flow Threat Model can vary significantly depending on the rules specified in the flow table. In the initial state, the degree centrality of all nodes is equal. However, if the attacker modifies the flow table by attacking OFS 1 , the degree centrality of VM 3 and VM 4 is increased, because the attacker can change the flow direction and consequently attack VM 3 and VM 4 directly. Applying Enterprise Linux Patch reduces the degree of centrality because the paths that attack VM 2 and VM 4 are blocked (i.e. although the attacker can reach those VMs, the vulnerability has been removed). Of course, there could be other vulnerabilities that could be exploited. We can still observe the importance of VM 1 and VM 3 increasing relatively as a result of applying Enterprise Linux Patch. Table 6 shows the results using the Betweenness centrality. In the Control Flow Threat Model, we set the starting node to A (i.e. the attacker node in the model) and the destination node to OFS 1 (i.e. a potential target node). We also considered all attack paths, not shortest paths. The results show that the betweenness centrality of the node CTL 1 is the highest in the Control Flow Threat Model (i.e. the average value among other nodes). Also, within each countermeasure scores, CTL 1 has the highest betweenness score. This implies that CTL 1 node sits between much of the attack paths in the experimental SDN, as captured by the TV-HARM. In the Control Flow Threat Model, CTL 1 has the highest betweenness centrality value.
Although these results show that there is no significant difference when using the Betweenness and Degree centrality measures for security assessment, other SDN environments with more complex attack scenario may discover otherwise. However, both approaches would highlight important nodes in the attack scenarios captured by TV-HARM, so the results would unlikely conflict. Hence, it is recommended to use both scoring systems to make meaningful security decision when selecting the countermeasure to deploy.
B. VULNERABILITY SCORE METRIC
Next, we evaluate the security of SDN based on the vulnerability information gathered as shown in Table 3 . We also consider some of the attacker's actions: we assume that if the attacker compromises the SDN controller, then the attacker is also able to modify the Flow Table by misconfiguring the OF Switches. In such a case, the probability of an attack success for compromising the OF Switch is one. Further, the Flow Table can be configured in such a way that would benefit the attacker the most, so the impact value is assigned to be 10. We also assume that all attack paths are equally likely to be exploited by the attacker, and each attack event is independent of others. However, these assumptions could be relaxed if we also introduce the probability of path selection, which could be modeled using the TV-HARM. However, it requires empirical analysis to assign appropriate values, which is out of scope in this paper. Figure 6 shows the security analysis based on vulnerability scores using the Control Flow Threat Model shown in Figure 3 . Table 7 (b) shows the detailed results. No. of Paths is the number of paths that an attacker can attack a target in the model. Shortest Path Length shows the distance of the shortest attack path, and Mean Path Length means the average distance of all attack paths. Max Probability represents the highest probability of attack success among the attack paths, and Total Probability means the sum of attack success probability of all attack paths by using the logical sum. Max Risk represents the risk of the highest risk path among the attack paths, and Total Risk means the sum of risk value of all attack paths. The model using the tv 1 only has an attack path exploiting the SDN controller (trivial case). This attack can be mitigated by simply applying SDN patch. For the model with tv 23 , there are six different attack paths for the attacker to exploit SDN controller. By applying the Linux Patch, all attack path including paths through VM 2 and VM 4 can be mitigated. As a result, only two attack paths are left, routing through VM 1 and/or VM 3 . On the other hand, applying DPI/CFR mitigates all attack paths. Hence, if the cost of applying those countermeasures are the same, then applying DPI/CFR is more effective. In case tv 123 , applying DPI/CFR reduces the number of attack paths the most compared with other countermeasures.
Only SDN patch is effective against tv 1 . In other scenarios, we observed that the mean path length reduces when different countermeasures are applied. However, it is difficult to relate the reduction in the mean path length to the security of the system.
The max probability is calculated based on the maximum value given by p ap c i for the attack paths. The attack scenario where the attacker exploits the SDN controller and the OF Switch had the highest p ap c i value. Hence, without deploying SDN patch in the given attack scenario, the max probability did not reduce. In the case of the model with tv 23 , the max probability reduced marginally when the Linux patch is applied, but in contrast, deploying the DPI/CFR removed all possible attack paths. Therefore, for the max probability analysis, it is critical to remove attack paths leading to exploiting the SDN controller.
The Total Risk metric accumulates the risk associated with each node in all possible attack paths given by r ap c i . This provides an overview of how much risk SDN has, and be able to compare the risk reduction using different countermeasures. Having more attack paths would increase the Total Risk value of SDN. When countermeasures reducing the number of attack paths are deployed, the Total Risk value reduces relatively.
In addition to the above, we also conducted a similar analysis using ONOS in the networked system. However, the result showed no difference with the analysis of the system using the ODL. Figure 7 shows the security analysis using the Data Flow Threat Model. If the attacker successfully compromises OFS 1 , the attacker can change the Flow Table. Consequently, the attacker can also exploit VM 3 and VM 4 directly, which was not possible before changing the Flow Table. As a result, the number of attack paths increased, while the number of shortest attack paths reduced. Further, the probability of an attack success as well as the system risk increased, showing the increases in security posture if the attacker can compromise OFS 1 . Taking into account the Linux Patch, we can reduce the number of attack paths and the Total Risk significantly, but only marginally reducing the Max Probability and the Total Probability values. We conclude that deploying countermeasures that affects as many attack paths decrease the security posture the most. If such a solution is not feasible, we conclude that mitigating attacks exploiting the OF Switch decrease the security posture than other countermeasures.
C. ATTACK IMPACT METRICS
We utilized the attack impact metrics as shown in Figure 5 to assess the security of the system. Table 8 shows the security assessment of the Control and Data Flow Threat Models. If tv 1 is considered, such as in Table 8 (a), the attacker can exploit the SDN controller directly with relatively high attack success probability, so the rate is regarded as high. If the attacker successfully compromises the SDN controller, the resulting impact is rated significantly. Combined together, the overall rating is Extreme. To mitigate this attack, SDN patch can be deployed to reduce the overall rating to Minimum, showing a significant improvement in the rating. The overall rating for the model taking into account tv 23 is also Extreme, but it can be reduced to Low by deploying the Linux Patch or DPI/CFR. This contrasts with tv 1 scenario, showing that different countermeasures are selected depending on the threat vectors considered in the analysis.
Table 8(b) shows that initially, the overall rating is relatively low, but it increased significantly when the attacker can successfully compromise OFS 1 as the security posture increased. For the countermeasure, we observed that deploying the Linux Patch decreased the security posture the most, as it reduced the most attack paths compared to other countermeasures we considered.
We used three different security assessment methods and observed the effects of different countermeasures. Network Centrality Measure (NCM) assesses the importance of nodes that form the networked system. Nodes with high NCM values contribute more significantly to the security assessment, as they are used more likely than other nodes in different attack paths. Hence, we assume that a countermeasure is more effective if it reduces the variance of the NCM values of each node. Second, we evaluated the security using the vulnerability score, particularly the number of paths, path length, the probability of attack success, and the system risk. This security evaluation focuses on the severity of each vulnerability and assesses their combined effects when a set of vulnerabilities are considered for an attack. Hence, a countermeasure minimizing the vulnerability score is the most effective one. Last, the attack impact metrics consider a 2D plane taking into account the attack rate and the impact. The effectiveness of countermeasures is assessed based on the amount of reduced attack rate and the impact.
In our evaluation, we observed that deploying the DPI/CFR is the most effective countermeasure based on the above three security assessment methods as a whole. In detail, deploying the DPI/CFR reduced the number of attack paths the most, mitigating many possible attack scenarios for our experimental system. This has led to the highest probability of attack and risk reduction as well. Similarly, other SDN and its security can be evaluated using the TV-HARM.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
SDN is vulnerable to various threats, both new and existing ones, that can lower the security level of SDN. To assess the impact of different threats in SDN, we proposed a security assessment framework for SDN. Our unique approach adopts graphical security models named TV-HARM, which models and assesses the security posture of SDN with respect to identified threat vectors. We assessed the security of SDN via threat modeling and analysis and evaluated the effectiveness of different countermeasures in our experimental analysis. In this section, we discuss limitations and future work related to SDN security assessment.
A. FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION
The framework can be deployed onto the control plane without any operational inputs from other SDN components. This framework will operate passively without interfering with the operations of SDN, and it is not dependent on SDN components. This ensures the framework is transparent to SDN operations, as well as the protection of the framework from being tampered with. This is an advantage to embed the security assessment feature into SDN technology. However, the implementation should consider that collected data cannot be exploited by the attacker, and access to the framework module is restricted from the data plane to limit the access of security assessment results by unauthorized persons also.
The framework can also be implemented as a stand-alone software tool, with appropriate interfaces to collect necessary data from SDN (e.g., collect control and data flows to assess the threats outlined in previous sections). Then, the tool can be an add-on to the control plane as a service to assess the security posture of SDN. This will provide portability of the tool and ability to extend its features to incorporate other networking technologies. To minimize the risk of the framework being tampered with, the interaction with the framework input and output should be restricted to trusted entities only (e.g., security administrators). Also, the interfaces should be carefully designed to ensure that attackers cannot gain access to SDN security assessment results by exploiting interface vulnerabilities.
B. SDN SECURITY MANAGEMENT
The framework provides an approach to evaluate the security of SDN by taking into account various SDN components and threat vectors. To enhance the security of SDN, however, one can also incorporate various techniques and tools. For example, Nayak et al. [17] proposed a security system named Resonance, which can update the access control policies dynamically using the flow-level and real-time alert information. The proposed framework can benefit and provide better countermeasure selection by combining the features of those techniques and tools. In addition, the exploitability of vulnerabilities that may exist in the SDN controller can be considered for prioritization of metric, which will be investigated in our future work.
C. DIFFERENT SDN CONTROLLERS
We looked at using ODL and ONOS for the SDN controller, but we did not take into account their functional difference in the security analysis, which may affect the security assessment and the countermeasure selection. Moreover, there are various other SDN controllers with diverse functionalities and capabilities [39] , [40] . Different SDN controllers have different security control features, which can also affect the security analysis. We will investigate different SDN functionalities and their effects on the security assessment in our future work.
D. SCALABILITY MANAGEMENT
Due to the capability of SDN to support efficient networking management, SDN can scale much larger than the traditional networks. Therefore, it is also important that the security model used can also scale and capture a large number of users, devices and SDN components to provide the full security assessment. Although the base model HARM provides scalability [13] , we did not consider how the TV-HARM could scale with respect to the size of SDN, especially when becomes large. We will investigate evaluating the scalability and applicability of the TV-HARM for large-sized SDN in our future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have summarized potential new threats in SDN. We have carried out threat modeling and security assessment to evaluate the security of SDN. We have used three security metrics including the Network Centrality Measure, Vulnerability score, and attack impact metrics using the Threat model using TV-HARM. For our experimental analysis, we have observed different countermeasures and their effectiveness, demonstrating the applicability of the framework and TV-HARM to capture various threat vectors in SDN. Hence, the proposed framework can be used for effectively evaluating the security of SDN taking into account various SDN threat vectors.
